GridCertLib: a Single Sign-on Solution for Grid Web Applications and
  Portals by Murri, Riccardo et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
10
1.
41
16
v3
  [
cs
.D
C]
  6
 Se
p 2
01
1
GridCertLib: a Single Sign-on Solution for Grid
Web Applications and Portals
R. Murri1, P. Kunszt2, S. Maffioletti1, and V. Tschopp3
1Grid Computing Competence Centre, Organisch-Chemisches Institut,
University of Zu¨rich, Winterthurerstr. 190, CH-8057 Zu¨rich,
Switzerland
2SystemsX, ETH Zu¨rich, Clausiusstr. 45, CH-8092 Zu¨rich, Switzerland
3SWITCH, Werdstrasse 2, CH-8004 Zu¨rich, Switzerland
Sep. 9, 2011
Abstract
This paper describes the design and implementation of GridCertLib, a Java library
leveraging a Shibboleth-based authentication infrastructure and the SLCS online cer-
tificate signing service, to provide short-lived X.509 certificates and Grid proxies.
The main use case envisioned for GridCertLib, is to provide seamless and secure
access to Grid X.509 certificates and proxies in web applications and portals: when a
user logs in to the portal using SAML-based Shibboleth authentication, GridCertLib
uses the SAML assertion to obtain a Grid X.509 certificate from the SLCS service and
generate a VOMS proxy from it.
We give an overview of the architecture of GridCertLib and briefly describe its pro-
gramming model. Its application to some deployment scenarios is outlined, as well as
a report on practical experience integrating GridCertLib into portals for Bioinformat-
ics and Computational Chemistry applications, based on the popular P-GRADE and
Django softwares.
1 Introduction
Most Grid computing middleware in production use today relies on X.509 certificate
proxies [44] for user authentication. This has been an issue when implementing web-
based interfaces to Grid computing facilities: in order to generate a proxy, a copy of the
X.509 private key is needed together with the passphrase used to encrypt it. However,
uploading the public/private key pair to a web portal is undesirable on security grounds.
Several solutions and workarounds have been implemented (see Section 2 below), but
none of them can be considered entirely satisfactory: either because they do not fully
address the security concerns, or because they require end users to take multiple steps,
possibly through different and unrelated user interfaces (e.g. a web portal and UNIX
shell commands).
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The solution we developed leverages two features offered by SWITCH: the feder-
ated authentication and authorization infrastructure SWITCHaai and the Short-Lived
Credential Service (SLCS). SWITCHaai is a federated authentication and authoriza-
tion infrastructure [40], based on Shibboleth2 [18]; SWITCHaai federates all Univer-
sities in Switzerland, plus major research centers and educational institutions. Similar
nationwide Authentication and Authorization Infrastructures (AAIs) exist in Germany,
Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and other countries [7]. A web service provider
(e.g., a portal) requiring SWITCHaai authentication will delegate the authentication
step to the user’s home institution Identity Provider (IdP). Users will be prompted
with the familiar login page of the home institution; after successful logon, the service
provider will receive a set of parameters and additional metadata (about the user) to
proceed with authorization [39].
SWITCH also provides the Short-Lived Credential Service (SLCS) and makes it
available to all SWITCHaai users [37]. SLCS is a web-service that can sign an X.509
certificate online; authentication and authorization to the SLCS service are based on
the SWITCHaai Shibboleth system. The online Certification Authority (CA) that signs
SLCS certificates is included in the International Grid Trust Federation (IGTF) bundle
[17], so SLCS certificates can be used for any legitimate Grid purpose. This enables any
user from a Swiss institution participating in the SWITCHaai Federation to request
a Grid-enabled X.509 certificate. It is valid up to 1’000’000 seconds (corresponding
to almost 11 days) which is short-lived in comparison to regular one-year certificates
issued by other CAs. A SLCS command-line client is also part of the gLite middleware
distribution [43].
The last key enabler for our project is the Shibboleth delegation feature, devel-
oped in the Shibboleth uPortal project [5]. The delegation is based on the Liberty
ID-WSF ECP Single Sign-On (SSO) profile [16], and allows SAML-based authentication
for Shibboleth-protected web service providers.1Based on the assertion resulting from
the web authentication through Shibboleth on the user portal, we are able to call the
SLCS service on the user’s behalf using the Enhanced Client or Proxy (ECP) profile.
Delegation, however, is still an experimental feature in Shibboleth, and is expected to
become standard in the next Shibboleth version 3.0. For our project, SWITCH has
upgraded their Shibboleth Virtual Home Organization identity provider and the SLCS
service provider with ECP delegation features.
GridCertLib is a Java library providing programming interfaces to create a SLCS
certificate and Grid proxy (optionally VOMS-enabled), given the Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) assertion resulting from a successful previous Shibboleth
authentication. The main use case envisioned for GridCertLib, is to provide seam-
less and secure access to Grid X.509 certificates and proxies in web portals: when
a user logs in to the portal using the regular SWITCHaai Shibboleth authentication,
GridCertLib uses the SAML assertion to obtain a Grid X.509 certificate from the SLCS
service and generate a Virtual Organisation Membership Service (VOMS) proxy from
it. None of these steps requires user interaction (after the initial Shibboleth authentica-
tion), making Grid resources as easy to use as any single-sign-on enabled web service
while retaining the full security stack.
The outline of the paper is as follows: first we provide an overview of similar solu-
tions already implemented in production-grade Grid web portals. In the next Section,
we review the requirements that were set for GridCertLib, its actual design and discuss
some implementation details. Finally, we report on some deployment scenarios and
1The interested reader can find readable introductions to Shibboleth and SAML in [19, 15].
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particularly on the integration of GridCertLib within a Bionformatics portal (based on
P-GRADE, [10]) and within a Computational Chemistry portal (based on Django, [8]).
2 An overview of existing solutions
Distributed authentication and authorization is a difficult problem to solve in a stan-
dard and integrated manner. In past Grid projects, proprietary services have often been
developed to address this issue (e.g. CAS[34], PRIMA[27], ROAM[6]) but none of
them established itself as a widely accepted community standard as they were too
tightly coupled with the middleware and the local resources. A standardization on
SAML/XACML profiles to be used by all middlewares is available [11] but has not been
widely adopted yet.
However, we can see two technologies that are widely accepted also outside of the
Grid community: SAML-based authentication using Shibboleth and X.509 certificates
to authenticate local resources, using short-lived proxy certificates. In most Grids, also
the VOMS cervice is used to enrich the proxy certificate with usage attributes for fine-
grained authorization. We are using the SLCS service as developed by SWITCH for
the Enabling Grids for E-sciencE (EGEE) consortium to generate certificates from the
users’ Shibboleth login. A similar but now defunct project was the U.S. GridShib effort
[4] to create a certificate based on a Shibboleth login also as a Certificate Authority.
In order to generate a certificate proxy, a copy of the X.509 private key is needed
together with the passphrase used to encrypt it. This poses a basic problem in web
portals: having direct access to the public/private certificate key pair of a user, although
technically feasible, is undesirable on security grounds: intruders getting access to the
portal machine would gain unrestricted access to all of the portal users’ credentials.
Some projects have worked around this issue by submitting to the Grid as a single
portal superuser, using credentials of a single entity for all Grid jobs issued through the
portal or through special-purpose certificates for automation, called “robot” certificates.
Robot certificates are X.509 certificates granted to a portal service or application,
rather than a human; users interested in running a certain application on the Grid can
log in to the portal, and the portal will operate on the Grid using the robot certificate.
This approach a few drawbacks:
1. The certificate private key is available on the portal machine, although this
can be prevented by using hardware-based protection (e.g. smartcards), as
done in the GILDA/GENIUS portal [3]. Indeed, guidelines [9] have been
issued by the IGTF on the generation and storage of private keys, and per-
missible key usage of automated clients (robots) that can hold credentials
issued by IGTF-accredited Certification Authorities, so this specific issue is
likely to become less relevant in the future.
2. The use of robot certificates moves the responsibility of user authentica-
tion and logging from the CA to the portal, thus implicitly introducing an
additional trust step in the Grid authentication infrastructure. Not all Grid
sites and resource providers might be happy with delegating trust this way.
3. It is difficult to provide per-user accounting of computational resource us-
age: jobs submitted through different interfaces (e.g., portal and command-
line) by the same user will be accounted to different end-entities, since all
popular Grid middlewares group usage records by certificate subject Dis-
tinguished Name (DN).
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The solution adopted in the P-GRADE portal [10, 23] is to have users upload a
long-lived proxy to a MyProxy server [32, 33, 25] and authorize the portal software
for automated retrieval of short-lived proxies for job submission and data movement.
However, this still requires users to deal with many of the complexities of manag-
ing X.509-based certificates and command-line tools, which has been found to be a
real barrier to Grid adoption in less tech-savvy user communities. In the newer WS-
PGRADE portal [24] the interaction with the MyProxy service has been streamlined
so no command-line interaction is necessary, user certificate can be directly uploaded.
However, the user still needs to apply for and manage a certificate that expires every
year. For the end-user it is a complication to use an authentication infrastructure that
does not blend with the native web portal authentication system. It interrupts the natu-
ral flow of operations in the web user interface, requiring either an additional password
(the certificate password to generate the proxy) or additional command-line operations
in order to proceed with Grid job submission and control.
An extension to this mechanism that blends more seamlessly with P-GRADE’s
web-based interface has been developed by the UK project SARoNGS in [14]. Click-
ing a button on the MyProxy web details page redirects the user to a web service
(Shibboleth-protected), which in turn loads a long-lived proxy into a specific MyProxy
server, and fills in the details in the P-GRADE configuration page.
The approach taken in GridCertLib, instead, requires no user interaction: once
the web-based Shibboleth login is successfully completed, the GridCertLib code can
generate an X.509 certificate through the SLCS service using the web service based ECP
delegation, and an accompanying Grid proxy. Details of this process are given in the
following sections.
The source code of GridCertLib is publicly available from http://gridcertlib.googlecode.com/
under the Apache License 2.0 [2].
3 Design and Implementation
3.1 Architecture overview
GridCertLib was designed to bridge Shibboleth-based and Grid X.509-based authenti-
cation services for web applications and portals.2 Its design goals were to allow easy
integration into any Java portal, and to minimize interaction with the user while retain-
ing the full security stack for Grid authentication and authorization.
The flow of interaction with the Java portal code and the SWITCHaai services il-
lustrated in Figure 1 was devised in order to accomplish the design objectives (numbers
in parentheses correspond to arrows in Figure 1):
(1) Users initiates log in to the web portal using Shibboleth single sign-on (i.e., request
a Shibboleth-protected URL).
(2) They are authenticated by their home organization’s identity provider IdP; this is
handled transparently by the Shibboleth software.3
2Henceforth, we shall briefly write “portal” to mean any web-based interactive application or service.
3A detailed understanding of the Shibboleth authentication process is not needed for working with Grid-
CertLib: it suffices to know that the outcome of a successful Shibboleth logon is a Security Assertion Markup
Language version 2 (SAML2) assertion stored in the web server on the Portal machine. The interested reader
is referred to [19, 39, 15] for an introduction to Shibboleth and SAML2.
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Figure 1: Interactions of GridCertLib with the other involved services. Components
in the center column are all part of the same web application (but they could be part
of different processes: for instance, the Shibboleth web login is usually handled by an
Apache module rather than by Java servlet code). Round boxes on the sides represent
services running on remote hosts, that GridCertLib interacts with over HTTP. A detailed
description of interactions is given in Section 3.1.
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(3) GridCertLib queries Apache’s mod shib to get the SAML2 assertion. The assertion
is exported, together with other authentication parameters, to any proxied web ser-
vice; portals may make use of these Shibboleth attributes to restrict certain services
or map users into user groups.
(4) The portal application code calls GridCertLib to obtain a short-lived Grid X.509
certificate signed by the SLCS CA. This step requires delegation of the Shibboleth
credentials (SAML2 assertion) to the SLCS login service, which is done through the
generic Identity Domain - Web Service Framework (ID-WSF) ECP Web Service
Client, developed by SWITCH [42].
(5) After logging in to the SLCS service, GridCertLib proceeds to generate an X.509
certificate and have it signed by the SLCS online CA, using code similar to the one
used by gLite’s slcs-init command-line client [43].
(6) The portal calls GridCertLib to create a grid proxy (with or without VOMS exten-
sions). Here GridCertLib is just a thin wrapper around the regular VOMS libraries,
mainly providing simpler fac¸ade calls for commonly-used cases.
(7) The certificate, private key and proxies are stored. Currently, GridCertLib provides
methods for persisting certificates and proxies to the filesystem; it is up to the portal
to move the files to different storage back-ends (e.g., databases), although it should
be noted that most Grid middlewares require the proxy to be in a known location
on the filesystem.
As soon as the GridCertLib code completes successfully, a valid certificate and
proxy are available on the filesystem and Grid operations can proceed.
The foreseen usage of GridCertLib in web portals (see Section Deployment Experiences)
called for implementation of additional features in GridCertLib:
a. The SLCS and the Grid/VOMS proxy generation functions can be called
independently. In particular, proxy generation does not rely on the SLCS
generation feature being called first. As a consequence, Grid proxy code
does not need Shibboleth authentication to run, it only expects a valid user
certificate to be available.
This is a portal user interface requirement: all that is necessary for gener-
ating an X.509 certificate is known after SLCS login, but proxy generation
requires additional data; namely, names of the VOs a user belongs to. Por-
tals might need to gather this additional data after a user has logged in.
b. The SLCS generation function can be called at any time, as long as the
SAML2 assertion resulting from the Shibboleth login process is available.
This is another portal user interface requirement: SLCS login and genera-
tion of X.509 certificates can take long times (from a user interface per-
spective), so they can be delayed at a later stage or started in an asyn-
chronous thread, in order not to delay the login process.
c. GridCertLib has a generic interface that can be used with any web appli-
cation or portal. In particular, GridCertLib does not make any assumption
on how user data (like the certificates) are represented and/or stored within
the portal, except that they can be stored on the filesystem.
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Feature a. led us to provide GridCertLib with two main independent entry points,
SLCSFactory and GridProxyFactory. An instance of each class is responsible for gen-
erating SLCS certificate and Grid proxies, respectively. To achieve portal independence,
each class constructor takes an explicit list of all the parameters needed for instan-
tiation, although they can also be conveniently provided by a single Java Properties
object.
Similarly, for the same goal c. of portal technology independence, GridCertLib
certificate and proxy generation functions accept an explicit list of all the required
parameters, but provide shortened forms that have common defaults.
Feature b. implies that the SLCS-generation methods in GridCertLib only require
the Shibboleth SAML assertion as input. However, the SAML2 assertion can expire long
before the Shibboleth session itself does (see Section 3.2.1). To solve this problem,
GridCertLib provides a re-usable servlet RenewAssertion, which can also be used as a
model for implementing assertion renewal in the portal code.
3.2 Core Library Implementation
GridCertLib core functions reside in the single Java package ch.swing.gridcertlib;
an additional package ch.swing.gridcertlib.servlet provides example servlets
(with fully-commented code) that show how the library can be used.
The main package ch.swing.gridcertlib has two public entry points:
• The SLCSFactory class provides the SLCS certificate generation functionality and
can store the certificate and its associated private key on the filesystem.
• The GridProxyFactory class creates Globus Toolkit proxy certificates with or
without VOMS extensions from available user certificates and stores them to a
temporary location on the filesystem.
A single instance of each of these classes can generate multiple SLCS certificates
or proxies, possibly for different Portal users, via repeated invocation of the certificate
creation methods.
Since the parameters used to configure the factory objects are portal-wide global
variables and their values are fixed while the portal application is running, each factory
class can be configured (at construction time) through a java.util.Properties object,
which can be conveniently loaded from a file with standard Java API calls. Alternatively,
a constructor that allows to specify all instance parameters explicitly is also provided.
However, GridCertLib does not enforce that only a single instance of these factory
objects exists. Different factory objects can be created to cater for different classes of
users (e.g., users coming from different Shibboleth federations). It is up to the web
application/portal code to route requests to the correct factory.
3.2.1 Creating SLCS Certificates
Upon calling the newSLCS method of the SLCSFactory class, a SLCSRequestor object
is created to carry out generation of the certificate and actual interaction with the SLCS
server. The reason for this split is twofold:
• SLCSFactory handles system-wide defaults, and thus a single instance is needed
to serve the whole portal, whereas a new SLCSRequestor object is created for
every certificate request.
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• The SLCSRequestor corresponds to the slcs-init command-line tool provided
in the gLite middleware distribution [43]; this eases porting of fixes from the
official SLCS client on to GridCertLib.
SLCS certificates are created following these steps:
1. Login to the SLCS server using ECP delegation: if successful, this returns
the subject DN to use in the X.509 certificate to be generated, and an autho-
rization token to validate the final certificate signing request to the same
SLCS server.
2. Locally generate an X.509 public/private key pair.
3. Locally generate an X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR), using the
subject DN and other X.509 constraints returned by step 1.
4. Submit the CSR to the SLCS server and get the signed certificate back.
All of the above steps keep data (like the password), which is necessary for the
private key, in memory. Only after a certificate has been successfully generated by the
SLCSRequestor will SLCSFactory save the result in a file and return the certificate file
path, private key path and private key password to the caller. Any of these three can be
defined by the client code by passing an optional argument to the newSLCS method;
by default, SLCSFactory uses a random password and stores the certificate and private
key files in a configurable directory (using a random file name, which is also returned
as a result of the call).
The SLCS service is a properly authorized Shibboleth Service Provider (SP). Since
GridCertLib is contacting SLCS on behalf of the user, and with no user intervention
at all, delegation of SAML credentials is needed. Shibboleth delegation is an experi-
mental feature available in Shibboleth2, by which the SAML2 assertion that initiates a
Shibboleth session on an SP, may be re-used to authenticate towards other web ser-
vice based SPs. Shibboleth delegation must be supported both on the IdP granting the
SAML2 assertion and the target SP receiving the delegated assertion (the SLCS server in
this case).
The requirement that SLCS generation may happen at any time after login to the por-
tal creates an additional complication: SAML2 assertions have a short time validity (5
minutes in the default configuration) but SP and IdP sessions last much longer (8 hours
by default), i.e., users are authenticated with the Shibboleth SP even after the SAML2
assertion is long expired. Therefore, by the time SLCSFactory.newSLCS is called, the
SAML2 assertion might be unusable for delegated authentication with the SLCS server.
There is no support in the Shibboleth API to get a fresh assertion in the IdP and store
it in the SP session, but this can be worked around by forcing an SP session logout,
followed by a redirection to a Shibboleth-protected URL: the SP will start a new ses-
sion and request a fresh assertion from the IdP. This can be implemented by a chain
of HTTP redirections, so that the whole procedure does not require any user interven-
tion. We implemented this workaround in the RenewAssertion servlet, described in
Section 3.2.3.
3.2.2 Creating Grid and VOMS proxies
The GridProxyFactory class is a interface wrapper on top of the VOMS Java API. Grid-
ProxyFactory implements a simplified interface to create a Grid proxy in the use case
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most frequently needed in web applications and portals: its newProxy method creates a
proxy (with optional VOMS extensions) given an X.509 certificate and private key, and
a (possibly empty) list of VOs to contact for VOMS ACs.
A single instance of the class can generate multiple proxies (possibly for different
users) via repeated invocation of the newProxy method. Since the org.glite.voms.con-
tact.VOMSProxyInit class uses system properties to determine part of its configuration,
it is not possible to create different instances of this class, each using its own config-
uration. This is not a limit in practice, as the org.glite.voms library has native support
for multiple servers and Virtual Organisation (VO) endpoints.
3.2.3 Example servlets
The provided sample servlets can run in any Java servlet container. They have been
successfully tested with the Jetty and Tomcat Java application servers (with an Apache
proxy front-end for managing the Shibboleth session).
Three servlets are distributed with the GridCertLib source code:
• SlcsInit: This servlet generates an X.509 certificate and private key and uses the
SLCS service to sign it. Upon successful completion, the certificate and private
key are stored in the filesystem.
• VomsProxyInit: This servlet creates a VOMS proxy and stores it in the filesystem.
• RenewAssertion: This servlet ensures that a fresh SAML assertion is stored in the
SP Shibboleth session cache.
A detailed description of each of these servlets follows.
SlcsInit. The ch.swing.gridcertlib.servlet.SlcsInit servlet extracts the SAML2 assertion
URL from the Shibboleth HTTP headers, downloads the assertion into memory, and uses
it to authenticate to a remote SLCS service and get a new certificate/private key pair. The
key is encrypted with a random password, and the certificate and private key locations
(on the filesystem) are printed in the response text.
If SLCSFactory detects an expired assertion in the SP session, it will raise an ex-
ception. The SlcsInit code catches the error and redirects the user’s browser to the
RenewAssertion servlet, setting the return address to the current page: when the user
browser is sent back to the return URL, a new SAML2 assertion will be in the SP cache.
VomsProxyInit. The ch.swing.gridcertlib.servlet.VomsProxyInit servlet creates a VOMS
proxy and stores it on the filesystem, in the default store directory. HTTP query parame-
ters can set arguments that are passed to the GridProxyFactory.newProxy method, thus
making this servlet a generic front-end to the GridProxyFactory class functionality.
This servlet does not require any interaction with the Shibboleth subsystem, and
can be deployed unprotected. It requires, however, that the certificate and private key
are available on the filesystem.
RenewAssertion. The ch.swing.gridcertlib.servlet.RenewAssertion servlet ensures that
a fresh assertion is stored in the SP Shibboleth session cache. It implements the workaround
described in a previous section for the “expired assertion” problem:
1. The user’s browser is redirected to the SP session logout URL.
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2. The logout function allows setting a “return address” via a URL query pa-
rameter, to which the browser will be redirected after the logout is done;
this “return address” is set to the RenewAssertion URL plus a trailing com-
ponent (URL “path information” part) that encodes the referring page URL.
3. The Shibboleth SP logs the user out of the session and destroys the cached
data, then redirects the user browser to the RenewAssertion URL.
4. The RenewAssertion page is Shibboleth-protected, so a new Shibboleth
authentication procedure begins. As long as the user session in the IdP is
still valid, this will not require user interaction, and the IdP will just send a
new SAML2 assertion to the requesting SP.
5. The RenewAssertion servlet detects that the browser is returning after the
initial visit (from the trailing portion of the URL), and redirects the user
to the initial requesting page (by decoding the URL embedded in the “path
information” component).
Note that none of the above steps requires any user interaction (unless the Shibbo-
leth session on the IdP is expired).
A request URL to RenewAssertion must be properly formatted; the convenience
method RenewAssertion.getRenewalUrl is provided to this purpose. However, the URL
encoding system in the RenewAssertion servlet imposes a limit on the length of return
URLs; more importantly, it cannot be used with HTTP POST requests, as there is no
way of encoding the POST data into a single URL. This is a technical issue which
we have not been able to work around so far: due to the large number of HTTP redi-
rects taking place, session cookies, query parameters, and other commonly-used ways
of associating state data with HTTP requests, may be lost before the final visit to the
RenewAssertion servlet.
4 Deployment experiences
The following points need to be taken into consideration by the portal providers:
• Since certificate generation can be time-consuming (relative to user interface
reaction times), it could be delayed to a later stage or executed asynchronously
in a separate thread. However, this delay was not a problem on the P-GRADE
Bioinformatics portal.
• The validity of the Shibboleth assertion is usually limited to a few minutes, so
the SLCS certificate request should not be delayed for too long. Of course if a
valid SLCS certificate for the user is already available from a previous login of
the user, the request can simply be omitted.
• When a VOMS-enabled proxy is needed, it is the portal’s responsibility to prompt
the user for the relevant information, e.g., VO name or Fully-Qualified Attribute
Name (FQAN) list. In the P-GRADE implementation, the users can set their
VOs in their settings page. There is a global default configuration option for the
administrator if every user is expected to be always member of the same VO.
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4.1 Integration into the P-GRADE portal
The P-GRADE portal comes with full Grid X.509 proxy support, which in this case is
a mixed blessing as many of the certificate management features need to be modified in
various places of the portal code. Out of the box, P-GRADE supports proxy certificate
upload or the usage of a MyProxy server to which the user has to upload the certificate
outside of P-GRADE.
In its standard form, P-GRADE provides no facilities for the creation of the certifi-
cates; this is a new feature we add using GridCertLib. We extended the Shibboleth-
enabled login [29] for the Gridsphere portal [13] (provided by the Australian MAMS
project [28]) by storing all Shibboleth attributes including the assertion and other at-
tributes that were not previously requested into a singleton object.
In the MAMS implementation, on first-time login using Shibboleth, the user is
presented with a registration request portlet which simply displays the attributes of the
user as received through the Shibboleth login by the server. Users can then simply press
a button “Send registration request”, which triggers an email to the portal administrator,
who can decide whether to enable the user account, and optionally assign it certain roles
in Gridsphere.
Users can simply reload the page or re-login once the admin has enabled them. At
the same time it is checked whether an SLCS certificate still exists for the given user and
whether it is valid for longer than 24 hours. If not, GridCertLib is used to create a new
SLCS certificate. The certificate location and other related information is stored together
with all other user attributes in the user table, which has been extended accordingly.
The VOMS configuration is the same for all users of the portal in our current imple-
mentation, which is set to the “life” VO of the national grid computing infrastructure
Swiss Multi-Science Computing Grid (SMSCG) [36], using a portal-wide configuration
of GridCertLib.
An issue remains: the delegation feature used by GridCertLib is not yet deployed as
a standard feature in the Swiss SWITCHaai federation, therefore we currently can only
make use of this whole mechanism through a special home organization, the Virtual
Home Organisation (VHO), provided by SWITCH for collaboration purposes. We have
a dedicated group in the VHO where we can administer our own users. This should
not be necessary anymore after the SWITCHaai federation has upgraded to a version
of Shibboleth that supports delegation, which should happen sometime in late 2011 or
2012.
For now, in the optimal case a user can log in through AAI by selecting the VHO as
the “home organization”, and is ready to submit Grid jobs to the Swiss Multi-Science
Computing Grid. Clicking on the “Certificates” tab will show the details of the current
certificates and their validity.
Expiration of the certificate is not an issue, as P-GRADE requests the download
of the results only when the user asks for it through the portal. The portal makes sure
that a new proxy is generated automatically in the background from the SLCS certificate
(if the existing proxy is not valid anymore). Should the SLCS certificate expire, a new
one is requested automatically at the next login, so unless the user is actively using the
portal browser window for 10 days with no interruption, this will not happen.
4.2 Integration into Django-based web applications
Django [8] is a high-level Python Web framework, providing reusable components
to build any sort of web application. We have used it to build a simple portal for
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users of the computational chemistry application GAMESS-US [35, 12]. The por-
tal uses the django-shibboleth application4 [31] to enable users to log in using their
SWITCHaai/Shibboleth credentials; new users will have their account created auto-
matically when they log in for the first time.
Django support in GridCertLib thus comprises two (inter-dependent) parts:
• A Python package, containing the access-control decorators5 certificate required
and gridproxy required. By using these decorators, a Django programmer can
easily mark some URLs as requiring the use of a valid SLCS certificate and/or
proxy.
• A set of Java servlets, which should be deployed alongside the Django site, that
interface with GridCertLib to provide the SLCS- and proxy-generation function-
ality.
All communication between the Django decorators and the corresponding servlets hap-
pens by means of HTTP redirects through the users’ web browser.
The GridCertLib Django decorators will first ensure that the HTTP request is authen-
ticated with the standard Django login system; when the django-shibboleth application
is installed, this automatically ensures that the HTTP request is part of a valid Shibboleth
session.
Next, GridCertLib Django decorators check that the certificate (resp. proxy certifi-
cate) exists and is valid. For the sake of processing speed (no response can be sent to the
web browser until the decorator has passed control to the view function), the decorators
assume that no other actor can modify the certificate/proxy files they have created: thus
a simple “modification time” check suffices to prove that a certificate/proxy is still in
its validity period. Note that, in contrast to what happens in the P-GRADE portal, the
certificate/proxy check happens each time the Django view function is invoked, and it
is thus essential to keep it performant.
If the certificate/proxy exists and is valid, environment variables are set to the
filesystem path of the relevant files to communicate the location to the Grid middle-
ware, and control is passed to the view function.
Otherwise, an HTTP redirect response is issued, channeling the web browser to the
URL corresponding to a Django-specific version SlcsInit or VomsProxyInit servlets. As
mentioned for the Example Servlets (see Section 3.2.3), only the SlcsInit URL needs
to be Shibboleth-protected.
HTTP session cookies are used to tell the servlets to store the certificate/proxy in a
certain filesystem location;6 however this poses a mild security threat: since the servlets
URLs must be public (so that the users’ web browsers can visit them), then an HTTP
request could be crafted to make the servlets read/write the certificate/proxy file in an
arbitrary location on the filesystem. Security is enforced with the following procedure:
4Django structures a web site as an set of web applications, each of which is attached to specific URLs
in the web site URL space. Applications can be packaged and deployed separately, and can be thus re-used
in different combinations to build a site.
5Django routes HTTP requests to Python functions (“view” functions), that are responsible for returning
content to the user. Access control is most easily done through Python function decorators: if a view function
is marked with the login required decorator, then Django ensures that HTTP requests to that URL come from
logged-in users, and will redirect any unauthorized request to the site login page.
6Since the SlcsInit and VomsProxyInit servlets run in a Java server, completely separated by the server
running Django, an issue arises as how to communicate certificate/proxy location and passphrases back and
forth from the Django decorator to the Java servlets.
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• Before starting the redirect to the a servlet, the Django access decorator creates
an empty directory L, creates a “marker” file in it, and writes a random string K
into this “marker” file.
• The decorator redirects the web browser to the servlet URL, passing along L and
K (as HTTP cookies).
• The servlet verifies that the “marker” file exists in L and that it has the expected
content K, then it deletes the “marker” file and proceeds. For added security, it
can optionally verify that L is a filesystem path starting with a configured prefix
(e.g., /var/www/portal), so that possible damage is confined to a portion of the
filesystem.
It is clear that the above procedure guarantees that hypothetical attackers can only trick
the GridCertLib servlets into writing into a location L if and only if they can already
write to L.
The added security layer is basically the only difference between the Django-
support servlets and the GridCertLib example servlets (see Section 3.2.3). After suc-
cessful creation of the certificate or proxy, the servlet redirects the web browser back
to the initial requesting page with no output.
As in the P-GRADE integration, two issues remain that might need special attention
in the future:
• The VOMS configuration is the same for all users: while it is possible to extend
the Django user object model to include individual VOMS information, this is
not necessary at present since all users of the GAMESS portal belong to the same
Virtual Organization.
• Until the delegation feature becomes a standard feature of SWITCHaai, users
have to select the special home organization VHO in order to use the portal.
Django support for GridCertLib provides an example of how GridCertLib can be
integrated into an existing web framework with little coding and only small edits to tune
the example servlet behavior to the interface expected by other portal components.
5 Conclusions and Future Developments
GridCertLib is an easy to use Java library that enables automatic creation of SLCS cer-
tificates and/or Grid proxies from SAML2 assertions obtained from successful Shib-
boleth authentication. It can be integrated into real-world Grid portals, hiding the
complexities of X.509 certificate usage from the portal user. This considerably low-
ers the barrier to Grid usage, potentially allowing much larger communities to profit
from Grid resources securely. Source code for GridCertLib is publicly available from
http://gridcertlib.googlecode.com/ under the Apache License version 2.0 [2].
The current implementation of GridCertLib relies on three key features of the
SWITCHaai infrastructure: Shibboleth authentication, ID-WSF ECP delegation, and the
SLCS online CA service. The integration of these three components together with a valid
access to a VOMS server, allow the creation of any community-specific web portal that
can leverage the national grid computing infrastructure SMSCG [36] thus enabling Grid
use by virtually any Swiss scientific community.
An interesting future development could be to adapt GridCertLib to draw certifi-
cates from the (recently created) TERENA on-line CA; this would lift the dependency on
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the Swiss infrastructure and potentially allow usage of GridCertLib on any European
Grid infrastructure.
More generally, one could investigate whether GridCertLib could be ported to pro-
vide its functionality on top of equivalent base technologies (e.g., substitute Shibboleth
with a different SAML-based federated authentication infrastructure). Developments in
this area could turn GridCertLib into a modular system capable of providing its func-
tionality for almost all Grid users today. No investigation has been carried out by us
in this area: the project that funded GridCertLib development had a practical scope
of producing a simple single sign-on solution for the selected portals; we are anyway
open to collaborations in this respect.
GridCertLib has already been successfully deployed and integrated into a Bioinfor-
matics portal based on P-GRADE, and into a Django-based Computational Chemistry
portal, proving the flexibility and re-usability of the library and its design.
We will assist in the integration of GridCertLib into portals that are in use in
Switzerland, like JOpera [21] and the new WS-PGRADE [22]. We will consider re-
quests for extensions in functionality of the GridCertLib based on the experience with
these new portals.
Looking further into the future, GridCertLib will greatly profit from the upgrade
of the SWITCHaai federation to the next version of Shibboleth: this will enable true
single-sign on and Grid usage in one portal, without the need to use a special VHO ac-
count. The SystemsX project SyBIT [41] also plans to upgrade its P-GRADE portal
from the current Gridsphere-based implementation to the more modern WS-PGRADE,
which makes use of the Liferay portal [26] technology: besides many portal-related im-
provements, this will allow the users to freely choose the VOMS attributes they wish to
associate with their proxy. However, due to the entirely new portal code base, a new
programming effort will be needed to integrate GridCertLib into the Liferay frame-
work.
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List of acronyms
AAI Authentication and Authorization Infrastructure
AC Attribute Certificate (VOMS, X.509)
API Application Programming Interface
CA Certification Authority
CSR Certificate Signing Request
DN Distinguished Name
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ECP Enhanced Client or Proxy
EGEE Enabling Grids for E-sciencE
FQAN Fully-Qualified Attribute Name (VOMS)
GAMESS General Atomic and Molecular Electronic Structure System, a
Computational Chemistry application (see [35, 12])
GC3 Grid Computing Competence Center, University of Zurich
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
ID-WSF Identity Domain - Web Service Framework (Shibboleth)
IGTF International Grid Trust Federation
IdP Identity Provider (Shibboleth)
MAMS Meta Access Management System, an Australian development project
(see [28])
PKI Private Key Infrastructure
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language
SAML2 Security Assertion Markup Language version 2
SARoNGS UK development project (see [20])
SLCS Short-Lived Credential Service
SMSCG Swiss Multi-Science Computing Grid
SP Service Provider (Shibboleth)
SSO Single Sign-On
SWITCH Swiss Academic Network Provider
TERENA Trans-European Research and Education Networking Association
URL Uniform Resource Locator
VHO Virtual Home Organisation
VOMS Virtual Organisation Membership Service
VO Virtual Organisation
XACML eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
15
References
[1] Alfieri, R., Cecchini, R., Ciaschini, V., dell’Agnello, L., Frohner, ´A., Lo˝rentey, K.,
Spataro, F.: From gridmap-file to VOMS: managing authorization in a Grid envi-
ronment, Future Generation Comp. Syst., Vol. 21, no. 4, 2005, pp. 549–558.
[2] The Apache Software Foundation: Apache License, Version 2.0,
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0. Cited April 17, 2011.
[3] Barbera, R., Donvito, G., Falzone, A., La Rocca, G., Milanesi, L.,
Maggi, G. P., and Vicario, S.: The GENIUS Grid Portal and robot certifi-
cates: a new tool for e-Science, BMC Bioinformatics 2009, 10(Suppl 6):S21,
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2105/10/S6/S21.
[4] Barton, T., Basney, J., Freeman, T., Scavo, T., Siebenlist, F., Welch, V., Anan-
thakrishnan, R., Baker, B., Goode, M., and Keahey, K.: Identity Federation and
Attribute-based Authorization through the Globus Toolkit, Shibboleth, Gridshib,
and MyProxy. 5th Annual PKI R&D Workshop, April 2006.
[5] Barton, T., Cantor, S., Olshansky, S.: Shib-uPortal Home,
https://wiki.shibboleth.net/confluence/display/ShibuPortal/Home.
Cited April 17, 2011.
[6] Burruss, J. R., Fredian, T. W. and Thompson. M. R. “ROAM: An Authorization
Manager for Grids”, Journal of Grid Computing 2006, Volume 4, Number 4,
Pages 413-423
[7] Cantor, S., et al.: Shibboleth Federations,
https://wiki.shibboleth.net/confluence/display/SHIB/ShibbolethFederations .
Cited April 17, 2011.
[8] Django, http://www.djangoproject.com.
[9] The European Grid Authentication Policy Management Authority
in e-Science: Guideline on IGTF Approved Robots, version 1.0.
http://www.eugridpma.org/guidelines/robot/. Cited Apr. 17, 2011.
[10] Farkas, Z. and Kacsuk, P.: P-GRADE Portal: A generic workflow system to sup-
port user communities, Future Generation Computer Systems, Vol. 27, Issue 5,
May 2011, pp. 454–465, ScienceDirect.
[11] Garzoglio, G., et. al. Definition and Implementation of a SAML-XACML Pro-
file for Authorization Interoperability Across Grid Middleware in OSG and
EGEE, Journal of Grid Computing 2009, Volume 7, Number 3, Pages 297–307),
doi:10.1007/s10723-009-9117-4
[12] Gordon, M. S. and Schmidt, M. W.: Advances in electronic structure theory:
GAMESS a decade later, pp. 1167–1189, in Theory and Applications of Compu-
tational Chemistry: the first forty years, Dykstra, C. E., Frenking, G., Kim, K. S.,
Scuseria, G. E. (eds), Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2005.
[13] Grisphere Portal, http://www.gridsphere.org/gridsphere/gridsphere .
Cited December 30, 2010.
16
[14] Hewitt, M., Kaushal, S.: Experiences of P-
GRADE at the White Rose Grid e-Science Centre,
http://portal.p-grade.hu/pucowo/download/slides/WRG-Mark-Shiv.ppt.
Presentation held at the 2010 P-GRADE User Communities Workshop (PU-
CoWo), ETH Zu¨rich, June 10, 2010.
[15] Hodges, J.: How to Study and Learn SAML
http://identitymeme.org/doc/draft-hodges-learning-saml-00.html
Cited September 9, 2011.
[16] Hodges, J., Aarts, R., Madsen, P., Cantor, S., Cahill, C., Champagne, D.,
Ellison, G., Lockhart, R., Whitehead, G.: Liberty ID-WSF Authenti-
cation, Single Sign-On, and Identity Mapping Services Specification
http://www.projectliberty.org/liberty/content/download/3441/22949/file/liberty-idwsf-authn-svc-2.0-diff-v1.0.pdf.
[17] IGTF: The International Grid Trust Federation Charter,
http://www.igtf.net/charter.html . Cited April 17, 2011.
[18] Internet2 Middleware Initiative: Shibboleth,
http://www.internet2.edu/shibboleth . Cited April 17, 2011.
[19] Internet2 Middleware Initiative: High Level Introduction to Shibboleth
http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/HighLevelIntro.html. Cited Septem-
ber 9, 2011.
[20] JISC: Shibboleth Access to Resources on the National Grid Service,
http://www.jisc.ac.uk/whatwedo/programmes/einfrastructure/sarongs.aspx .
Cited April 17, 2011.
[21] JOpera, http://www.jopera.org/ .
[22] Kacsuk, P.: P-GRADE portal family for Grid infrastructures, Concurrency and
Computation: Practice and Experience, Vol. 23, Issue 3, 2011, pp. 235–245
[23] Kacsuk, P., and Sipos, G.: Multi-Grid, Multi-User Workflows in the P-GRADE
Portal, Journal of Grid Computing, Vol. 3, No. 3-4, pp. 221–238, Springer Pub-
lishers, 2005
[24] Kacsuk, P. et al.: WS-PGRADE: supporting parameter sweep applications in
workflows, 3rd Workshop on Workflows in Support of Large-Scale Science,
In conjunction with SC 2008, pp. 1–10, IEEE, Austin, TX, USA (2008).
doi:10.1109/WORKS.2008.4723955
[25] Kouril, D., and Basney, J.: A Credential Renewal Service for Long-Running Jobs.
6th IEEE/ACM International Workshop on Grid Computing (Grid 2005), Seattle,
WA, November 13-14, 2005.
[26] Liferay portal, http://www.liferay.com/ .
[27] Lorch, M. and Kafura, D.: The PRIMA Grid Authorization System, Journal of
Grid Computing, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 279–298, Springer Publishers, 2005.
[28] MAMS project: Meta Access Management System,
https://mams.melcoe.mq.edu.au/zope/mams. Cited April 17, 2011.
17
[29] MAMS project: Shibbolizing GridSphere demo,
https://mams.melcoe.mq.edu.au/zope/mams/kb/all/GridSphere%20Wink%20demo.zip/view.
Cited April 17, 2011.
[30] MTA/SZTAKI: Grid User Support Environment,
http://www.guse.hu/?m=architecture&s=0 . Cited April 17, 2011.
[31] Morrison, S.: django-shibboleth: Shibboleth login/registration integration,
http://code.arcs.org.au/gitorious/django/django-shibboleth . Cited
April 17, 2011.
[32] NCSA, MyProxy Credential Management Service,
http://grid.ncsa.illinois.edu/myproxy/ . Cited December 30, 2010.
[33] Novotny, J., Tuecke, S., and Welch, V.: An Online Credential Repository for the
Grid: MyProxy. Proceedings of the Tenth International Symposium on High Per-
formance Distributed Computing (HPDC-10), IEEE Press, August 2001, pages
104-111.
[34] Pearlman, L., Welch, V., Foster, I. Kesselman, C. and Tuecke, S. “ Commu-
nity Authorization Service for Group Collaboration”, Proceedings of the 3rd In-
ternational Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks, 2002,
pp.50–59.
[35] Schmidt, M. W., Baldridge, K. K., Boatz, J. A., Elbert, S. T., Gordon, M. S.,
Jensen, J. H., Koseki, S., Matsunaga, N., Nguyen, K. A., Su, S., Windus, T. L.,
Dupuis, M., and Montgomery, J. A.: General Atomic and Molecular Electronic
Structure System, J. Comput. Chem., 14, 1347–1363(1993).
[36] SMSCG project: Swiss Multi-Science Computing Grid,
http://www.smscg.ch/ . Cited April 17, 2011.
[37] SWITCH: Description of the SLCS, http://www.switch.ch/grid/slcs/about/about_long.html.
Cited April 17, 2011.
[38] SWITCH: Expert Session Add-On, http://www.switch.ch/aai/demo/2/expert_session.html .
Cited April 17, 2011.
[39] SWITCH: Simple Demo, http://www.switch.ch/aai/demo/2/simple.html .
Cited April 17, 2011.
[40] SWITCH: SWITCHaai – the key that connects students and the university,
http://www.switch.ch/aai. Cited April 17, 2011.
[41] SystemsX.ch: SyBIT: Systems Biology IT,
http://www.systemsx.ch/projects/systemsxch-projects/sybit/ .
Cited April 17, 2011.
[42] Tschopp, V.: ID-WSF ECP Web Service Client,
https://forge.switch.ch/redmine/projects/idwsfecp . Cited December
30, 2010.
[43] Tschopp, V., and Witzig, Ch.: “Short-lived Credential Service - User Guide”,
EGEE-II project, 2006, https://edms.cern.ch/document/788604/1.
18
[44] Tuecke, S., Welch, V., Engert, D., Pearlman, L., and Thompson, M.: Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Proxy Certificate Profile, RFC3820, The
Internet Society, June 2004, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3820.txt.
19
